Files
rar-autopass/app/security.py
Claude Agent 4a2afc68bf chore: curatare agresiva comentarii — scoatere referinte US/PRD din cod si template-uri
Eliminat zgomotul de trasabilitate (US-xxx, PRD x.x, Rn, OV-x, Tn, decizii/naratiune
istorica) din 41 fisiere app/ + template-uri. Pastrate comentariile care documenteaza
invarianti si logica ne-evidenta (idempotenta/hash, reconciliere anti-duplicat, RAR 500
esec definitiv, creds per cont, WAF User-Agent, 422 fara echo de parola, scope NULL->1),
curatate doar de tokeni.

Verificare: pentru cele 27 module .py curatate, structura de cod (tokeni non-comentariu/
non-string) e IDENTICA fata de HEAD -> doar comentarii/docstring-uri schimbate. Singura
schimbare de cod e in tests/test_web_responsive.py (scos 3 assert pe markeri US-006/007/008,
inlocuite de asertiunile structurale alaturate). 0 tokeni US/PRD reziduali in app/.
Regresie: 896 passed, 1 deselected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 21:44:24 +00:00

165 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Redactare credentiale (CORE securitate).
Corpul lui POST /v1/prezentari contine `rar_credentials.password` (creds RAR
per-cerere, zero-storage). Aceste valori NU trebuie sa apara NICIODATA in:
- raspunsuri de eroare (422 Pydantic echo-eaza `input` => parola) — vezi
`app.main.validation_exception_handler`;
- loguri / traceback-uri uvicorn — vezi `CredentialRedactingFilter`;
- repr-ul modelelor (str(creds)) — vezi `RarCredentials` (Field repr=False).
Modulul e pur (fara DB/HTTP), unit-testabil direct.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import re
from typing import Any
MASK = "***REDACTED***"
# Chei al caror continut e secret oriunde apar (case-insensitive). `denumire`
# etc. raman in clar — doar credentialele si token-urile se mascheaza.
SENSITIVE_KEYS = frozenset(
{
"password",
"parola",
"pwd",
"pass",
"rar_credentials",
"credentials",
"token",
"jwt",
"authorization",
"api_key",
"apikey",
"x-api-key",
"secret",
}
)
# Chei al caror continut e PII de identificare vehicul/proprietar: se logheaza DOAR
# partial (ultimele 4), niciodata integral (L.142/GDPR).
PII_PARTIAL_KEYS = frozenset({"vin", "nr_inmatriculare", "nr", "numar"})
def vin_partial(value: Any) -> str:
"""VIN/numar mascat partial: pastreaza ultimele 4 caractere, restul `…`.
'WVWZZZ1KZAW000123' -> 'WVW…0123'. Sub 4 caractere -> doar masca. Suficient
pentru a corela un rand fara a expune identificatorul integral in jurnal.
"""
s = str(value if value is not None else "").strip()
if not s:
return ""
if len(s) <= 4:
return ""
return f"{s[:3]}{s[-4:]}" if len(s) > 7 else f"{s[-4:]}"
def redact_pii(obj: Any) -> Any:
"""Ca `scrub`, plus mascare partiala a VIN/numar (PII_PARTIAL_KEYS).
Folosit la scrierea jurnalului (observ.log_event): mai intai mascam credentialele
integral (scrub), apoi reducem VIN/nr la forma partiala. Recursiv pe dict/list.
"""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
out: dict = {}
for k, v in obj.items():
if isinstance(k, str) and k.lower() in SENSITIVE_KEYS:
out[k] = MASK
elif isinstance(k, str) and k.lower() in PII_PARTIAL_KEYS and not isinstance(v, (dict, list)):
out[k] = vin_partial(v)
else:
out[k] = redact_pii(v)
return out
if isinstance(obj, (list, tuple)):
return [redact_pii(v) for v in obj]
return obj
def scrub(obj: Any) -> Any:
"""Copie a structurii cu valorile cheilor sensibile mascate, recursiv.
Pentru `rar_credentials`/`credentials` masheaza intregul subarbore (nu doar
`password`) — un dict de creds e secret integral. Listele si dict-urile se
parcurg in adancime; scalarii trec neatinsi.
"""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
out: dict = {}
for k, v in obj.items():
if isinstance(k, str) and k.lower() in SENSITIVE_KEYS:
out[k] = MASK
else:
out[k] = scrub(v)
return out
if isinstance(obj, (list, tuple)):
return [scrub(v) for v in obj]
return obj
# Mascare in text liber (mesaje de log, traceback-uri formatate). Acopera formele
# uzuale: JSON ("password": "x"), kwargs (password='x'), Bearer <token>.
_TEXT_PATTERNS = [
# "password": "secret" / 'password' : 'secret' (JSON / dict repr)
re.compile(
r"""(?P<key>["']?(?:password|parola|pwd|pass|token|jwt|secret|api[_-]?key)["']?\s*[:=]\s*)"""
r"""(?P<q>["'])(?P<val>(?:\\.|[^"'\\])*)(?P=q)""",
re.IGNORECASE,
),
# password=secret (fara ghilimele, pana la separator)
re.compile(
r"""(?P<key>\b(?:password|parola|pwd|token|jwt|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*=\s*)(?P<val>[^\s,;&)}\]]+)""",
re.IGNORECASE,
),
# Authorization: Bearer <token> / Bearer eyJ...
re.compile(r"""(?P<key>Bearer\s+)(?P<val>[A-Za-z0-9._\-]+)""", re.IGNORECASE),
]
def scrub_text(text: str) -> str:
"""Masheaza credentiale dintr-un sir liber (loguri, traceback)."""
if not text:
return text
out = text
for pat in _TEXT_PATTERNS:
out = pat.sub(lambda m: m.group("key") + MASK, out)
return out
class CredentialRedactingFilter(logging.Filter):
"""Filtru de logging care masheaza credentiale din orice record emis.
Atasat pe root + logger-ele uvicorn (vezi `install_log_redaction`). Lucreaza
pe mesajul DEJA formatat (cu args interpolate), apoi goleste args ca
formatter-ul sa nu reinterpoleze. Tot ce trece prin logging e curatat;
parolele in variabile locale de traceback nu ajung in mesaj (Python nu
formateaza locals implicit), deci raman protejate.
"""
def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool:
try:
msg = record.getMessage()
except Exception:
return True
scrubbed = scrub_text(msg)
if scrubbed != msg:
record.msg = scrubbed
record.args = ()
return True
def install_log_redaction() -> None:
"""Instaleaza filtrul de redactare pe root + logger-ele uvicorn (idempotent)."""
filt = CredentialRedactingFilter()
targets = [
logging.getLogger(), # root
logging.getLogger("uvicorn"),
logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error"),
logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access"),
]
for lg in targets:
if not any(isinstance(f, CredentialRedactingFilter) for f in lg.filters):
lg.addFilter(filt)