Cod_prestatie necunoscut in nomenclator nu se mai trimite raw la RAR (HTTP 500
ORA-12899 + record partial FINALIZATA pe care reconcilierea il marca fals sent):
e promovat la cod_op_service si tratat ca operatie de mapat.
Optiune top-level boolean on_unmapped_error pe POST /v1/prezentari + /valideaza:
- false (default) -> submission needs_mapping (intra in editor)
- true -> respinge fara enqueue (status error, submission_id=null, erori)
- None -> default per-cont accounts.on_unmapped_error_default (implicit 0)
Inlocuieste enum-ul anterior on_unmapped (needs_mapping/error) cu un boolean mai
simplu; coloana de cont migrata aditiv la INTEGER on_unmapped_error_default.
Izolare teste de .env-ul de dezvoltare: tests/conftest.py fixeaza default sigur
pe AUTOPASS_REQUIRE_API_KEY / AUTOPASS_WORKER_USE_TEST_CREDS (precedenta peste
.env in pydantic-settings) + fixturile env din test_creds_delivery/test_t1 pineaza
explicit aceste flag-uri, ca fallback-ul creds pe cont sa fie atins.
Teste: 752 passed (fara flag pe CLI).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Aduce toate suprafetele dashboard-ului la grila tabelului Trimiteri, muta
navigarea intr-un meniu de cont (hamburger) si da panoului admin actiuni
reale de ciclu de viata. 9 stories, 3 valuri. UI pur (reskin + reasezare)
cu O SINGURA exceptie backend: modelul de stare a contului.
- US-001 sectiunea "Ajutor" eliminata din Acasa (wayfinding redundant).
- US-002 Nomenclator la grila standard (_submissions.html ca referinta).
- US-003 macro autosend compact (Manual<->Auto). Semantica de PREZENTA
`auto_send` (bifat->true, absent->false) NEALTERATA — compatibil cu ambele
parsere (Form(bool) la /mapari, bool(form.get()) la import). Zero backend.
- US-004 accounts.status (pending/active/blocked/archived/deleted), migrare
defensiva idempotenta derivata din `active`, gate worker claim_one pe
status='active' (echivalenta active=1 <=> status='active' pastrata).
- US-005 tabel Mapari compact + panou Ajutor (<details>, proza o singura data),
coloana "In coada".
- US-006 meniu hamburger dropdown (Cont/Integrare/Nomenclator/Admin/logout) +
context is_authenticated/is_admin/csrf_token defensiv in base.html.
- US-007 tab-bar redus la Acasa+Mapari; rutele /_fragments/{cont,integrare,
nomenclator} + deep-link ?tab= raman valide.
- US-008 rute admin block/archive/delete + bulk pe lista account_id,
require_admin + CSRF + PRG, dev id=1 sarit in bulk.
- US-009 admin UI: selectie bife + master + bara bulk + kebab per-rand,
grupare pe stare (bloc nou blocate/arhivate), nota "cont dev implicit" scoasa.
Stergere = SOFT: tombstone (status='deleted'), dar PII purjata IMEDIAT
(rar_creds_enc + chei API revocate + CUI eliberat pentru re-inregistrare),
GDPR/L.142.
VERIFY: 671 teste pass (+40). E2E browser (Playwright) a prins 2 bug-uri
invizibile la TestClient: bara bulk cu display:flex inline invingea [hidden]
(mutat in CSS .bulk-bar[hidden]); conturi arhivate cadeau sub "in asteptare"
(grupare pe status). /code-review high a prins 2 bug-uri reale: soft delete
pastra creds RAR + CUI la nesfarsit fara purjare accounts (GDPR neonorat);
apostrof in numele firmei rupea confirm() inline din kebab — ambele reparate,
plus cleanup boilerplate rute (_lifecycle_route).
Backend trimitere (worker masina stari/idempotenta/mapping) neatins, cu
exceptia gate-ului de cont. Design: docs/design/5.5-uniformizare-ui.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canalul web trece de la 100% deschis (hardcodat cont 1) la autentificat si
multi-tenant. Un service nou se inregistreaza din browser, primeste o cheie API
(o singura data) si o sesiune; contul se creeaza "in asteptare" (active=0) si nu
trimite la RAR pana la activarea de catre admin (tools/account.py activate).
- users + app/users.py: parole scrypt (salt per-user, eticheta parametri onorata
la verify pentru migrare cost), email unic case-insensitive
- sesiune: SessionMiddleware (same_site=strict, https_only config) + app/web/session.py
(current_account/web_account/require_login->LoginRequired, set_session clear-inainte)
- CSRF (app/web/csrf.py) enforce in prod inclusiv pe login/signup + rate-limit
in-proces (app/web/ratelimit.py) pe signup si login
- signup/login/logout (app/web/auth_routes.py): signup tranzactie atomica,
cheie-o-data, log SIGNUP pentru descoperire admin
- dashboard + import scoped pe contul sesiunii (regula NULL->cont 1); toate rutele
web care ating date sensibile sub require_login; nomenclator ramane global
- banner "cont in asteptare" pentru conturi active=0
- gate worker: claim_one LEFT JOIN accounts COALESCE(active,1)=1 (account_id NULL=activ)
VERIFY context curat (2 runde): leak cross-account /_fragments/mapari prins+reparat.
/code-review high: csrf_token lipsa pe re-randari de eroare, scrypt_params ignorat,
login fara rate-limit -- toate reparate. 361 teste pass (de la 313).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- mark(sent): seteaza purge_after = now + 90 zile (GDPR/L.142)
- purge_expired(conn): sterge submissions sent expirate + import_batches expirate
(import_rows via ON DELETE CASCADE). NULL purge_after = nu expira.
- run(): tick de purjare odata pe ora (guard _last_purge_time + _PURGE_INTERVAL_S)
NU mai agresiv, nu blocheaza trimiterea
- 8 teste: purge_after la sent, alte stari fara purge, expirati vs neexpirat,
queued neatins, cascade import_rows, null purge_after pastrat
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan sect.5: parola RAR vine per-cerere, stocata CRIPTATA in submission pana la
primul login reusit pe cont, apoi stearsa; JWT 30h acopera restul.
- app/crypto.py: Fernet, cheie din AUTOPASS_creds_key (nesetata -> efemera la
runtime, creds nu supravietuiesc restartului). encrypt/decrypt_creds.
- schema + migrare: submissions.rar_creds_enc (creds criptate).
- ingestie: cripteaza rar_credentials, le lipeste de fiecare submission nou.
Niciodata in clar in DB.
- worker: AccountSessions (login per-cont cu creds decriptate, cache JWT in
memorie, sterge creds-urile contului dupa primul login + refresh nomenclator).
401 creds gresite -> error fara retry; token expirat -> invalidare + requeue;
fara creds (restart) -> requeue "indisponibile" (ROAAUTO re-trimite).
claim_one intoarce account_id + creds_enc; recover_orphans filtrabil pe cont.
- requirements: cryptography==46.0.5.
Nota: refresh nomenclator e acum lazy la primul login per-cont (nu la pornire);
seed-ul fallback acopera editorul offline.
10 teste noi (tests/test_creds_delivery.py). 95 pass total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
T5 reinterpretat: nu import DBF, ci editor web al maparii operatie ROAAUTO ->
cod RAR, cu fuzzy lookup si validare de catre utilizator.
- Contract hibrid: item prestatie accepta cod_prestatie (RAR direct, back-compat)
SAU cod_op_service+denumire (mapat de gateway prin operations_mapping).
- Ingestie: op intern necunoscut -> submission needs_mapping (nu pleaca la RAR);
codul rezolvat se scrie inapoi in payload_json -> payload builder + worker neatinse.
- Editor HTMX (_mapari.html + GET /_fragments/mapari, POST /mapari): listeaza
op-urile nemapate, fuzzy preselecteaza codul RAR, save -> re-rezolvare automata
(queued / needs_data).
- Fuzzy: rapidfuzz.token_sort_ratio pe denumire normalizata (fara diacritice).
- Nomenclator: seed fallback 18 coduri la boot (offline) + refresh live din worker.
- Cont default id=1 cat timp auth API-key (CORE) nu exista (account_id NULL).
- Endpointuri API: GET /v1/mapari/pending, POST /v1/mapari (respinge cod inexistent).
- 15 teste noi (tests/test_mapping.py); 69 pass total.
- Contract actualizat (docs/api-rar-contract.md), rapidfuzz==3.14.5 in requirements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
