Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude Agent
504b490d3b feat(web): self-onboarding multi-tenant + auth sesiune (PRD 3.3a)
Canalul web trece de la 100% deschis (hardcodat cont 1) la autentificat si
multi-tenant. Un service nou se inregistreaza din browser, primeste o cheie API
(o singura data) si o sesiune; contul se creeaza "in asteptare" (active=0) si nu
trimite la RAR pana la activarea de catre admin (tools/account.py activate).

- users + app/users.py: parole scrypt (salt per-user, eticheta parametri onorata
  la verify pentru migrare cost), email unic case-insensitive
- sesiune: SessionMiddleware (same_site=strict, https_only config) + app/web/session.py
  (current_account/web_account/require_login->LoginRequired, set_session clear-inainte)
- CSRF (app/web/csrf.py) enforce in prod inclusiv pe login/signup + rate-limit
  in-proces (app/web/ratelimit.py) pe signup si login
- signup/login/logout (app/web/auth_routes.py): signup tranzactie atomica,
  cheie-o-data, log SIGNUP pentru descoperire admin
- dashboard + import scoped pe contul sesiunii (regula NULL->cont 1); toate rutele
  web care ating date sensibile sub require_login; nomenclator ramane global
- banner "cont in asteptare" pentru conturi active=0
- gate worker: claim_one LEFT JOIN accounts COALESCE(active,1)=1 (account_id NULL=activ)

VERIFY context curat (2 runde): leak cross-account /_fragments/mapari prins+reparat.
/code-review high: csrf_token lipsa pe re-randari de eroare, scrypt_params ignorat,
login fara rate-limit -- toate reparate. 361 teste pass (de la 313).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 16:43:21 +00:00
Claude Agent
ef52dc2823 feat(import): T16 job purjare + purge_after SET la sent (OV-5)
- mark(sent): seteaza purge_after = now + 90 zile (GDPR/L.142)
- purge_expired(conn): sterge submissions sent expirate + import_batches expirate
  (import_rows via ON DELETE CASCADE). NULL purge_after = nu expira.
- run(): tick de purjare odata pe ora (guard _last_purge_time + _PURGE_INTERVAL_S)
  NU mai agresiv, nu blocheaza trimiterea
- 8 teste: purge_after la sent, alte stari fara purge, expirati vs neexpirat,
  queued neatins, cascade import_rows, null purge_after pastrat

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 20:24:59 +00:00
Claude Agent
12f0ca3a81 feat(import): T1 accounts.rar_creds_enc durabil + worker fallback + gate purjare
- worker: _creds_from_account(conn, account_id) — fallback la accounts.rar_creds_enc
  cand submission n-are creds (canal web fara re-pusher, restart worker)
- run(): creds = _creds_for(claimed, settings) OR _creds_from_account(conn, account_id)
- gate purjare (Voce#5): comentariu explicit — sterge DOAR submissions.rar_creds_enc,
  NU accounts.rar_creds_enc (inofensiv pt canal web, neatins pt canal API)
- POST /v1/conturi/rar-creds: seteaza creds durabile criptate Fernet per cont
- DELETE /v1/conturi/rar-creds: revenire la modelul efemer Treapta 1
- 7 teste: fallback, restart, coada mixta, endpoint set/delete, gate purjare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 20:18:41 +00:00
Claude Agent
fbb2695336 feat(creds): livrare creds per-cerere la worker (criptat efemer + sesiuni per-cont)
Plan sect.5: parola RAR vine per-cerere, stocata CRIPTATA in submission pana la
primul login reusit pe cont, apoi stearsa; JWT 30h acopera restul.

- app/crypto.py: Fernet, cheie din AUTOPASS_creds_key (nesetata -> efemera la
  runtime, creds nu supravietuiesc restartului). encrypt/decrypt_creds.
- schema + migrare: submissions.rar_creds_enc (creds criptate).
- ingestie: cripteaza rar_credentials, le lipeste de fiecare submission nou.
  Niciodata in clar in DB.
- worker: AccountSessions (login per-cont cu creds decriptate, cache JWT in
  memorie, sterge creds-urile contului dupa primul login + refresh nomenclator).
  401 creds gresite -> error fara retry; token expirat -> invalidare + requeue;
  fara creds (restart) -> requeue "indisponibile" (ROAAUTO re-trimite).
  claim_one intoarce account_id + creds_enc; recover_orphans filtrabil pe cont.
- requirements: cryptography==46.0.5.

Nota: refresh nomenclator e acum lazy la primul login per-cont (nu la pornire);
seed-ul fallback acopera editorul offline.

10 teste noi (tests/test_creds_delivery.py). 95 pass total.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 20:16:16 +00:00
Claude Agent
a6df3b636f feat(T5): editor web mapare operatii (hibrid + fuzzy + on-demand needs_mapping)
T5 reinterpretat: nu import DBF, ci editor web al maparii operatie ROAAUTO ->
cod RAR, cu fuzzy lookup si validare de catre utilizator.

- Contract hibrid: item prestatie accepta cod_prestatie (RAR direct, back-compat)
  SAU cod_op_service+denumire (mapat de gateway prin operations_mapping).
- Ingestie: op intern necunoscut -> submission needs_mapping (nu pleaca la RAR);
  codul rezolvat se scrie inapoi in payload_json -> payload builder + worker neatinse.
- Editor HTMX (_mapari.html + GET /_fragments/mapari, POST /mapari): listeaza
  op-urile nemapate, fuzzy preselecteaza codul RAR, save -> re-rezolvare automata
  (queued / needs_data).
- Fuzzy: rapidfuzz.token_sort_ratio pe denumire normalizata (fara diacritice).
- Nomenclator: seed fallback 18 coduri la boot (offline) + refresh live din worker.
- Cont default id=1 cat timp auth API-key (CORE) nu exista (account_id NULL).
- Endpointuri API: GET /v1/mapari/pending, POST /v1/mapari (respinge cod inexistent).
- 15 teste noi (tests/test_mapping.py); 69 pass total.
- Contract actualizat (docs/api-rar-contract.md), rapidfuzz==3.14.5 in requirements.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 19:25:21 +00:00
Claude Agent
77088daf29 feat(T2): reconciliere anti-duplicat + retry/backoff + recuperare orfane
Inchide bucla de trimitere (plan.md sect. 4 worker, failure registry).

- app/reconcile.py: match_finalizata pe vin+dataPrestatie+odometruFinal (int),
  alege id maxim la duplicate (RAR accepta duplicate, confirmat live)
- app/rar_client.get_finalizate: parseaza data.content (descoperit live ca
  ruta = GET /prezentari/getAllPrezentariFinalizate; filtrele nu merg pe test)
- app/worker rescris:
  - recuperare orfane (rand 'sending' peste lease = worker mort mid-POST)
  - pe eroare tranzitorie/timeout: reconciliere INAINTE de re-send (anti-duplicat);
    daca recordul exista la RAR -> sent fara re-POST
  - retry/backoff exponential; peste worker_max_retries -> error + banner
  - re-login la token expirat (JWT 30h)
- schema: coloana next_attempt_at (backoff) + migrare aditiva in init_db
- config: worker_sending_lease_s, worker_retry_base_s/max_s, worker_max_retries
- contract: documentata ruta+forma getAllPrezentariFinalizate (verificat live)

Verify: pytest 54 passed (15 noi T2) + validare live (reconciliere record 68514).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 18:20:32 +00:00
Claude Agent
f1b5f1f80f feat: schelet gateway FastAPI (API v1 + worker + dashboard + SQLite WAL)
Structura repo conform plan.md sect. 4, booteaza cu /healthz verde:
- app/main.py: FastAPI (lifespan init_db), /healthz (worker viu + last login + queue), /metrics
- app/api/v1: POST /v1/prezentari (enqueue + dedup idempotency UNIQUE), GET prezentari/{id}, nomenclator, mapari
- app/rar_client.py: client RAR real (login/JWT, nomenclator, postPrezentare, getFinalizate) cu User-Agent obligatoriu (fix WAF 403)
- app/worker: proces separat, claim atomic BEGIN IMMEDIATE, heartbeat, login+send (send dezactivat by default)
- app/web: dashboard Jinja2+HTMX (coada, banner alerta blocate, worker viu/mort, stari empty)
- app/db.py + schema.sql: SQLite WAL, tabele accounts/api_keys/operations_mapping/nomenclator_rar/submissions/worker_heartbeat
- app/idempotency.py + payload.py: hash continut canonic + builder payload (status FINALIZATA, fara tipPrestatie)
- Dockerfile + docker-compose.yml (api+worker, volum SQLite persistent, restart:always)
- tools/import_dbf.py: stub T5

Verificat live: login prin rar_client OK (token 259), nomenclator 18 coduri, worker heartbeat -> /healthz worker_alive=True.
Ramas: T3 validare Pydantic, T4 snapshot payload, T2 reconciliere/retry worker, T5 import DBF, auth API-key, middleware redactare creds, criptare PII.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 12:04:11 +00:00