Canalul web trece de la 100% deschis (hardcodat cont 1) la autentificat si
multi-tenant. Un service nou se inregistreaza din browser, primeste o cheie API
(o singura data) si o sesiune; contul se creeaza "in asteptare" (active=0) si nu
trimite la RAR pana la activarea de catre admin (tools/account.py activate).
- users + app/users.py: parole scrypt (salt per-user, eticheta parametri onorata
la verify pentru migrare cost), email unic case-insensitive
- sesiune: SessionMiddleware (same_site=strict, https_only config) + app/web/session.py
(current_account/web_account/require_login->LoginRequired, set_session clear-inainte)
- CSRF (app/web/csrf.py) enforce in prod inclusiv pe login/signup + rate-limit
in-proces (app/web/ratelimit.py) pe signup si login
- signup/login/logout (app/web/auth_routes.py): signup tranzactie atomica,
cheie-o-data, log SIGNUP pentru descoperire admin
- dashboard + import scoped pe contul sesiunii (regula NULL->cont 1); toate rutele
web care ating date sensibile sub require_login; nomenclator ramane global
- banner "cont in asteptare" pentru conturi active=0
- gate worker: claim_one LEFT JOIN accounts COALESCE(active,1)=1 (account_id NULL=activ)
VERIFY context curat (2 runde): leak cross-account /_fragments/mapari prins+reparat.
/code-review high: csrf_token lipsa pe re-randari de eroare, scrypt_params ignorat,
login fara rate-limit -- toate reparate. 361 teste pass (de la 313).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan sect.5: parola RAR vine per-cerere, stocata CRIPTATA in submission pana la
primul login reusit pe cont, apoi stearsa; JWT 30h acopera restul.
- app/crypto.py: Fernet, cheie din AUTOPASS_creds_key (nesetata -> efemera la
runtime, creds nu supravietuiesc restartului). encrypt/decrypt_creds.
- schema + migrare: submissions.rar_creds_enc (creds criptate).
- ingestie: cripteaza rar_credentials, le lipeste de fiecare submission nou.
Niciodata in clar in DB.
- worker: AccountSessions (login per-cont cu creds decriptate, cache JWT in
memorie, sterge creds-urile contului dupa primul login + refresh nomenclator).
401 creds gresite -> error fara retry; token expirat -> invalidare + requeue;
fara creds (restart) -> requeue "indisponibile" (ROAAUTO re-trimite).
claim_one intoarce account_id + creds_enc; recover_orphans filtrabil pe cont.
- requirements: cryptography==46.0.5.
Nota: refresh nomenclator e acum lazy la primul login per-cont (nu la pornire);
seed-ul fallback acopera editorul offline.
10 teste noi (tests/test_creds_delivery.py). 95 pass total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Redactare:
- handler RequestValidationError dropeaza input/ctx din 422 (vectorul de
scurgere a rar_credentials.password pe /v1/prezentari); pastreaza type/loc/msg
- app/security.py: scrub/scrub_text + CredentialRedactingFilter pe root+uvicorn
- models.py: password cu repr=False
Auth API-key:
- app/auth.py: hash SHA-256 in api_keys (cheia in clar emisa o singura data),
header X-API-Key / Authorization: Bearer, dependency resolve_account_id
- enforcement pe flag AUTOPASS_require_api_key (prod on->401, dev off->cont
default id=1; cheie prezenta invalida->401 mereu)
- account_id real curge din cheie in ingestie + mapare
- tools/apikey.py: CLI create/rotate/revoke/list (fara endpoint HTTP admin)
16 teste noi (tests/test_security.py). 85 pass total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
