feat(discord-bridge): punte Discord -> Claude Code pe LXC 171

Implementeaza planul claude-master-plan-discord-bridge-20260830 (15 taskuri,
3 lane-uri paralele) — un bot subtire discord.py peste CLI-ul `claude`, cu
proces persistent per fir alimentat pe stdin cu --input-format stream-json.

Nucleu: runner (proces persistent + reaper 20min + respawn --resume), stream
(parser tolerant), session_store (scriere atomica, lock per fir, detectare PID
reuse, recovery), limits (max 4 procese, timeout tur, rate per user, plafon cost
pe zi), render (un loop de editare per canal, interval adaptiv).

Adaptor: allowlist guild/canal/user fail-closed cu respingerea webhook-urilor,
comenzi !new/!cd/!model/!status/!stop/!cleanup, cost si model in subsolul
fiecarui raspuns. Mesajul sosit in timpul unui tur devine steering, nu tur nou.

Securitate: hook PreToolUse fail-closed care cere confirmare in Discord pentru
operatiuni ireversibile, wrapper `infra` cu lista explicita de hosturi. Deny
rules raman strat cosmetic, nu bariera (verificat: /usr/bin/ssh trece pe langa).

Ops: alerte email pe conventia repo-ului, !cleanup pentru orfani, unit systemd
user cu KillMode=control-group si limite de memorie, install.sh idempotent.

Verificat: 275 teste fara retea/Discord/API (10.8s), identic cu si fara
discord.py instalat; e2e pe CLI real confirma steering-ul mid-tur (mesaj la 6s
intr-un tool call de 25s schimba raspunsul final).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B29CApsP1JkSdjYaGaHpE7
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Claude Agent
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# Securitatea puntii Discord -> Claude Code (Lane B)
Botul ruleaza CLI-ul `claude` cu `--permission-mode bypassPermissions`. Asta e o decizie
deliberata: accesul la nodurile Proxmox, la LXC-uri si la VM-uri este **functionalitate ceruta**,
nu accident. S-a verificat empiric ca regulile `deny` din settings **nu sunt o bariera**
(`/usr/bin/ssh -V` si `bash -c "ssh -V"` trec pe langa ele) — raman doar strat cosmetic.
Straturile reale sunt:
| Strat | Unde | Ce face |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Control de acces | `bot.py` (Lane A) | cine poate scrie in canal |
| 2. Confirmare pentru operatiuni ireversibile | `confirm_hook.py` + `approvals.py` | hook PreToolUse care blocheaza si asteapta un buton in Discord |
| 4. Poarta spre infrastructura | `infra` + token Proxmox cu ACL | hosturi dintr-o lista explicita, fiecare apel jurnalizat |
Stratul 3 (audit append-only pe branch dedicat) a fost respins constient de utilizator.
---
## 1. Fluxul de confirmare
```
claude (bypassPermissions)
| PreToolUse (JSON pe stdin)
v
confirm_hook.py --- clasificator ---> nepericuloasa ---> exit 0, fara iesire (flux normal)
|
| ireversibila
v
~/.claude-discord/approvals/<request_id>.json (status: pending)
| ^
| (bot.py vede cererea prin | submit_decision("allow"|"deny")
| set_on_request si posteaza |
| butoanele in fir) |
v |
polling pe disc, pana la 300s -----------+
|
v
{"hookSpecificOutput": {"permissionDecision": "allow"|"deny", ...}}
```
Hook-ul si botul sunt **procese diferite** (hook-ul e pornit de CLI-ul `claude`), de aceea
canalul dintre ele e un director pe disc si nu memoria botului.
### Formatul fisierului de cerere
`~/.claude-discord/approvals/<request_id>.json`, scris atomic (tmp + `os.replace`):
```json
{
"request_id": "3f9a1c2b7d4e5f60",
"thread_id": "1234567890",
"session_id": "b1c2...",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"command": "rm -rf /var/lib/vz/dump",
"rule": "rm_recursiv",
"reason": "stergere recursiva (rm -r)",
"cwd": "/workspace/romfastsql",
"created_at": 1756512000.0,
"expires_at": 1756512300.0,
"status": "pending",
"decision": null,
"decided_at": null,
"decided_by": null
}
```
- `status`: `pending` -> `allow` / `deny`. Botul schimba doar `status`, `decision`, `decided_at`.
- `thread_id` vine din variabila de mediu `CLAUDE_DISCORD_THREAD_ID`, pe care Lane A o pune in
mediul procesului `claude` al firului respectiv. Lipsa ei inseamna `null` si cererea ajunge
in canalul principal.
- Dupa decizie, hook-ul muta fisierul in `approvals/done/<request_id>.json` (cu `finished_at`),
ca `pending_requests()` sa nu-l mai vada. `cleanup_stale()` sterge ce e mai vechi de o zi.
### API-ul consumat de bot (contract INTERFACES.md)
```python
await approvals.wait_for_decision(request_id, timeout) # "allow" | "deny" (timeout => deny)
approvals.submit_decision(request_id, "allow") # True daca cererea exista
await approvals.pending_requests() # cereri in asteptare
approvals.set_on_request(callback) # callback async la fiecare cerere noua
```
`set_on_request` porneste un watcher pe directorul de cereri (poll 0.5s) daca exista o bucla
asyncio activa; `set_on_request(None)` il opreste. Un callback care arunca nu opreste watcher-ul.
### Fail-closed
Orice abatere inseamna **deny**, cu motiv explicit trimis inapoi in CLI:
- JSON invalid sau payload care nu e obiect;
- `~/.claude-discord` lipseste (hook-ul nu improvizeaza un director nou);
- cererea nu poate fi scrisa pe disc;
- fisierul cererii dispare sau devine JSON corupt in timpul asteptarii;
- niciun raspuns in `CLAUDE_DISCORD_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` secunde (implicit 300);
- orice alta exceptie, prinsa de plasa finala din `main()`.
Toate cazurile de mai sus au test in `tests/test_confirm_hook.py`.
---
## 2. Ce prinde clasificatorul
Analizeaza doar tool-ul `Bash`. Comanda e tokenizata cu `shlex` (operatorii `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`
raman token-uri separate), impartita in segmente, iar fiecare segment e curatat de wrappere
(`sudo`, `env FOO=1`, `timeout 30`, `nohup`, `nice`, atribuiri `VAR=val`) inainte de a fi
clasificat pe numele de baza al executabilului (deci `/bin/rm` = `rm`). Intra recursiv in
`bash -c "..."`, `sh -c "..."`, `ssh host "..."`, `pct exec ... -- ...`, `docker exec ... ...`
(maxim 5 niveluri).
Reguli: `rm -r`, `rm -f` pe cai de sistem, `find -delete`, `shred`, `dd`, `mkfs*`, `wipefs`,
`fdisk`/`parted`/`sgdisk`, redirectare in `/dev/...` (mai putin `/dev/null|stdout|stderr|tty`),
`shutdown`/`reboot`/`halt`/`poweroff`/`init 0|6`, `pct|qm destroy|restore`, `pvesh delete`,
`pvesm remove|free`, `pveceph destroy*|purge`, `zfs destroy|rollback`, `zpool destroy|labelclear`,
`lvremove`/`vgremove`/`pvremove`, `systemctl stop|disable|mask|kill` pe servicii de infra,
`systemctl -H`, `git push --force`, `git clean -f`, `git reset --hard`, `docker system prune`,
`docker volume rm`, `docker rm -f`, `chmod|chown -R` pe cai de sistem, `DROP`/`TRUNCATE` pe
obiecte Oracle, si orice `ssh`/`scp`/`rsync`/`infra` catre un host de productie
(10.0.20.36, .37, .200, .201, .202, `pve1`, `pvemini`, `pveelite`, `roacentral`).
## 3. Ce NU prinde (limitele asumate)
Acesta e un strat impotriva **accidentelor**, nu impotriva unui atacator. Cine controleaza
promptul poate ocoli detectia banal. Concret, NU sunt prinse:
- **Ofuscarea**: `echo cm0gLXJmIC8= | base64 -d | sh`, `R=rm; $R -rf /tmp/x`,
`python3 -c "import shutil; shutil.rmtree('/x')"`, `perl -e 'unlink...'`, `eval "$CMD"`.
Hook-ul vede text, nu semantica.
- **Comenzi dintr-un fisier**: `./cleanup.sh`, `make clean`, `npm run reset`, un hook git —
continutul scriptului nu e citit. La fel `sqlplus @drop_all.sql`: numele fisierului nu spune
ce e inauntru.
- **Alte tool-uri**: `Write`, `Edit`, `NotebookEdit`, tool-urile MCP nu trec prin clasificator.
Un `.sh` distructiv poate fi scris fara confirmare (rularea lui, insa, se vede ca `Bash`).
- **Variabile si expansiuni**: `rm -rf "$DIR"` cere confirmare (regula `rm -r`), dar
`rm -f "$FILES"` nu, fiindca nu stim ce contine variabila.
- **API in loc de CLI**: `curl -X DELETE https://10.0.20.201:8006/api2/json/nodes/...` nu e
clasificat ca stergere (doar hostul de productie ar fi prins daca executabilul ar fi ssh/rsync;
cu `curl` nu e).
- **`ssh` cu optiuni cu valoare**: `ssh -p 2222 host cmd` poate incurca detectarea hostului
(valoarea `2222` e luata drept host), deci comanda remota nu mai e analizata.
- **Falsuri pozitive acceptate**: orice `rm -r`, chiar in `/tmp`, cere confirmare. E zgomot
deliberat: un clic e mai ieftin decat un director sters gresit.
- **Auto-aprobarea**: hook-ul si botul ruleaza sub acelasi utilizator, deci un agent care vrea
neaparat isi poate scrie singur `"status": "allow"` in fisierul cererii. Consecinta directa a
respingerii stratului 3 (user separat / audit independent), asumata explicit.
---
## 4. Wrapper `infra`
```bash
infra --list # hosturile permise
infra pvemini pct list # ruleaza comanda pe nodul Proxmox
infra oracle docker ps
INFRA_DRY_RUN=1 infra pvemini uptime # arata comanda ssh, nu o executa
```
- Hostul e cautat intr-o lista **explicita**. Un host absent e refuzat imediat, fara DNS:
`exit 3`. Fara comanda: `exit 2`. Fisier de hosturi corupt: `exit 4`. Altfel, codul de iesire
este cel al comenzii remote.
- Lista implicita e in `infra` (`DEFAULT_HOSTS`) si poate fi inlocuita integral cu
`~/.claude-discord/infra-hosts.json`:
```json
{
"pvemini": {"addr": "10.0.20.201", "user": "root", "prod": true, "desc": "nod principal"},
"oracle": {"addr": "10.0.20.121", "user": "root"},
"oracle-prod": {"addr": "10.0.20.36", "user": "romfast", "prod": true}
}
```
Daca fisierul exista, **inlocuieste** lista implicita (nu se adauga la ea).
- Fiecare apel — inclusiv refuzurile — se scrie pe o linie in `~/.claude-discord/logs/infra.log`:
```
2026-08-30T11:20:41 host=pvemini target=root@10.0.20.201 rc=0 dur=0.42s cmd=pct list
2026-08-30T11:21:03 host=router.local target=- rc=refuzat dur=0.00s cmd=reboot note=host in afara listei
```
Jurnalul e un ajutor de depanare, nu un audit: ruleaza sub acelasi user si poate fi rescris.
---
## 5. Instalare
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude-discord/{approvals/done,logs}
chmod 700 ~/.claude-discord
# settings pasat botului cu --settings
cp proxmox/lxc171-claude-agent/discord-bridge/security/bot-settings.json.example \
~/.claude-discord/bot-settings.json
# ajusteaza calea absoluta a hook-ului daca repo-ul nu e in /workspace/romfastsql
# wrapper-ul in PATH
ln -s /workspace/romfastsql/proxmox/lxc171-claude-agent/discord-bridge/security/infra ~/bin/infra
```
Variabile de mediu (puse de Lane A in mediul procesului `claude`):
| Variabila | Rol | Implicit |
|---|---|---|
| `CLAUDE_DISCORD_DIR` | muta `~/.claude-discord` (teste) | `~/.claude-discord` |
| `CLAUDE_DISCORD_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT` | cat asteapta hook-ul o decizie, in secunde | `300` |
| `CLAUDE_DISCORD_THREAD_ID` | firul in care se posteaza butoanele | — |
| `INFRA_DRY_RUN` | `infra` doar tipareste comanda ssh | — |
Atentie: `timeout` din `bot-settings.json` (330s) trebuie sa ramana **mai mare** decat
`CLAUDE_DISCORD_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT`, altfel CLI-ul taie hook-ul inainte sa apuce sa refuze curat.
---
## 6. Token Proxmox cu ACL restrans (pasi manuali)
**Nu a fost creat nimic pe cluster.** Comenzile de mai jos se ruleaza de om, ca `root` pe
`pvemini` (10.0.20.201). Tokenul acopera operatiile de *citire si control de alimentare* pe care
le vrea puntea; `VM.Allocate` (crearea/distrugerea de guest-uri) este **intentionat lasat afara**.
```bash
# 1. utilizator dedicat pentru punte
pveum user add claude-bridge@pve --comment "punte Discord -> Claude Code (LXC 171)"
# 2. rol cu strictul necesar
# - audit/monitorizare: sa poata raspunde la "ce mai face clusterul"
# - PowerMgmt + Console: start/stop/reboot pe guest si `pct exec`-uri prin API
pveum role add ClaudeBridge -privs "\
Datastore.Audit,\
Sys.Audit,Sys.Console,Sys.Syslog,\
VM.Audit,VM.Monitor,VM.Console,VM.PowerMgmt"
# 3. legarea rolului de utilizator (pe tot arborele; restrange la /vms/<id> daca vrei mai putin)
pveum acl modify / --users claude-bridge@pve --roles ClaudeBridge
# 4. tokenul propriu-zis, cu separare de privilegii activa
pveum user token add claude-bridge@pve discord --privsep 1
# ^ afiseaza SECRETUL O SINGURA DATA. Copiaza-l acum.
# 5. ACL explicit pentru token (necesar cand privsep=1)
pveum acl modify / --tokens 'claude-bridge@pve!discord' --roles ClaudeBridge
# 6. verificare
pveum acl list
pveum user token list claude-bridge@pve
```
Pe LXC 171, secretul se pune in `~/.claude-discord/env` (fisier `0600`, deja folosit de Lane A):
```
PVE_API_URL=https://10.0.20.201:8006/api2/json
PVE_TOKEN_ID=claude-bridge@pve!discord
PVE_TOKEN_SECRET=<secretul afisat la pasul 4>
```
Test rapid (citeste, nu schimba nimic):
```bash
curl -sk -H "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=${PVE_TOKEN_ID}=${PVE_TOKEN_SECRET}" \
"${PVE_API_URL}/nodes" | jq '.data[].node'
```
Pentru revocare: `pveum user token remove claude-bridge@pve discord`.
**Ce ramane in sarcina omului:** pasii 1-6 de mai sus pe `pvemini`, copierea secretului in
`~/.claude-discord/env`, `chmod 600` pe acel fisier si decizia daca ACL-ul ramane pe `/` sau se
restrange la un subset de guest-uri. Puntea nu creeaza si nu roteste tokenul singura.
Tokenul **nu inlocuieste** cheile SSH existente din `~/.ssh` — retragerea lor a fost respinsa
deliberat, fiindca accesul SSH la infrastructura e functionalitate ceruta. Tokenul e o cale
alternativa, cu drepturi mai mici, pentru operatiile care se pot face prin API.
---
## 7. Teste
```bash
cd proxmox/lxc171-claude-agent/discord-bridge
python3 -m pytest tests/test_confirm_hook.py tests/test_infra.py -q
```
Fara retea, fara Discord, fara cluster. `tests/test_infra.py` ruleaza totul cu `INFRA_DRY_RUN=1`,
iar `tests/test_confirm_hook.py` include si un test in care hook-ul e pornit ca proces separat si
aprobat din exterior — exact granita reala dintre hook si bot.

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"""Stratul de securitate al puntii Discord -> Claude Code (Lane B).
Contine canalul de aprobari pe disc (approvals.py), hook-ul PreToolUse
(confirm_hook.py) si wrapper-ul `infra` pentru accesul la infrastructura.
"""

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"""Canal de aprobari pe disc intre hook-ul PreToolUse si botul Discord.
Hook-ul `confirm_hook.py` ruleaza in alt proces decat botul (il porneste CLI-ul
`claude`), deci canalul dintre ele este un director de cereri:
~/.claude-discord/approvals/<request_id>.json cerere in asteptare
~/.claude-discord/approvals/done/<request_id>.json cerere incheiata
Regula de baza: FAIL-CLOSED. Orice eroare, timeout, fisier corupt sau director
lipsa inseamna "deny". Modulul nu atinge reteaua si nu stie nimic despre Discord.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import pathlib
import time
import uuid
# config.py apartine Lane A si poate lipsi in unele contexte (hook rulat izolat).
# Import tolerant, cu acelasi fallback pe ~/.claude-discord.
try: # pragma: no cover - depinde de contextul de import
from .. import config as _config # type: ignore
except Exception: # pragma: no cover
try:
import config as _config # type: ignore
except Exception:
_config = None # type: ignore
ALLOW = "allow"
DENY = "deny"
PENDING = "pending"
_POLL_S = 0.2 # cat de des verificam decizia pe disc
_WATCH_S = 0.5 # cat de des verificam cereri noi pentru bot
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- cai pe disc
def state_dir() -> pathlib.Path:
"""~/.claude-discord, cu CLAUDE_DISCORD_DIR ca override (folosit in teste)."""
override = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_DISCORD_DIR")
if override:
return pathlib.Path(override)
if _config is not None:
try:
return pathlib.Path(_config.STATE_DIR)
except Exception:
pass
return pathlib.Path.home() / ".claude-discord"
def approvals_dir() -> pathlib.Path:
return state_dir() / "approvals"
def done_dir() -> pathlib.Path:
return approvals_dir() / "done"
def log_dir() -> pathlib.Path:
return state_dir() / "logs"
def ensure_dirs() -> None:
"""Creeaza subdirectoarele de aprobari.
Nu creeaza directorul de baza: daca ~/.claude-discord lipseste inseamna ca
puntea nu e instalata, iar hook-ul trebuie sa refuze (fail-closed), nu sa
improvizeze un director nou.
"""
base = state_dir()
if not base.is_dir():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"directorul de stare lipseste: {base}")
approvals_dir().mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
done_dir().mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# ------------------------------------------------------------ scriere atomica
def _write_atomic(path: pathlib.Path, payload: dict) -> None:
"""tmp + os.replace, ca un cititor sa nu vada niciodata JSON pe jumatate."""
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
tmp = path.parent / f".{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}.tmp"
data = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
try:
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(data)
fh.flush()
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
os.replace(tmp, path)
finally:
try:
tmp.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
def _read(path: pathlib.Path) -> dict | None:
"""Citeste o cerere. JSON corupt sau fisier disparut => None."""
try:
raw = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except OSError:
return None
try:
obj = json.loads(raw)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return None
return obj if isinstance(obj, dict) else None
# --------------------------------------------------------------- API interna
# (folosita de confirm_hook.py; botul nu are nevoie de ea)
def new_request_id() -> str:
return uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
def create_request(
*,
tool_name: str,
command: str,
reason: str = "",
rule: str = "",
thread_id: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
cwd: str | None = None,
timeout: float = 300.0,
request_id: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Scrie o cerere de confirmare si o returneaza. Arunca daca nu poate scrie."""
ensure_dirs()
rid = request_id or new_request_id()
now = time.time()
req = {
"request_id": rid,
"thread_id": thread_id,
"session_id": session_id,
"tool_name": tool_name,
"command": command,
"rule": rule,
"reason": reason,
"cwd": cwd,
"created_at": now,
"expires_at": now + float(timeout),
"status": PENDING,
"decision": None,
"decided_at": None,
"decided_by": None,
}
_write_atomic(approvals_dir() / f"{rid}.json", req)
return req
def request_path(request_id: str) -> pathlib.Path:
return approvals_dir() / f"{_safe_id(request_id)}.json"
def _safe_id(request_id: str) -> str:
"""Nu lasam un id sa evadeze din director prin `../`."""
rid = str(request_id)
if not rid or "/" in rid or "\\" in rid or rid.startswith("."):
raise ValueError(f"request_id invalid: {rid!r}")
return rid
def read_decision(request_id: str) -> str:
"""`allow` / `deny` / `pending`. Orice problema => `deny` (fail-closed)."""
try:
req = _read(request_path(request_id))
except Exception:
return DENY
if req is None:
return DENY
status = req.get("status")
if status == ALLOW:
return ALLOW
if status == PENDING:
return PENDING
return DENY
def finish_request(request_id: str, status: str, note: str = "") -> None:
"""Muta cererea in `done/`, ca `pending_requests()` sa nu o mai vada."""
try:
src = request_path(request_id)
req = _read(src) or {"request_id": request_id}
req["status"] = status if status in (ALLOW, DENY) else DENY
req["finished_at"] = time.time()
if note:
req["note"] = note
_write_atomic(done_dir() / f"{_safe_id(request_id)}.json", req)
try:
src.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except Exception:
pass
def cleanup_stale(max_age_s: float = 86400.0) -> int:
"""Sterge cereri incheiate mai vechi de o zi. Returneaza cate a sters."""
n = 0
now = time.time()
try:
for p in done_dir().glob("*.json"):
try:
if now - p.stat().st_mtime > max_age_s:
p.unlink()
n += 1
except OSError:
pass
except Exception:
pass
return n
# ---------------------------------------------------- API publica (Lane A/bot)
async def wait_for_decision(request_id: str, timeout: float) -> str:
"""Asteapta decizia pentru o cerere. La timeout sau eroare returneaza `deny`."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + max(0.0, float(timeout or 0))
while True:
decision = read_decision(request_id)
if decision in (ALLOW, DENY):
return decision
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
return DENY
await asyncio.sleep(_POLL_S)
def wait_for_decision_sync(request_id: str, timeout: float) -> str:
"""Varianta blocanta, pentru hook (proces separat, fara bucla asyncio)."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + max(0.0, float(timeout or 0))
while True:
decision = read_decision(request_id)
if decision in (ALLOW, DENY):
return decision
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
return DENY
time.sleep(_POLL_S)
def submit_decision(request_id: str, decision: str) -> bool:
"""Apelata de bot.py cand utilizatorul apasa butonul.
True daca cererea exista si a fost marcata. O decizie nerecunoscuta este
tratata ca `deny` si returneaza False.
"""
try:
path = request_path(request_id)
except Exception:
return False
req = _read(path)
if req is None:
return False
valid = decision in (ALLOW, DENY)
req["status"] = decision if valid else DENY
req["decision"] = req["status"]
req["decided_at"] = time.time()
try:
_write_atomic(path, req)
except Exception:
return False
return valid
async def pending_requests() -> list[dict]:
"""Cererile inca in asteptare, cele mai vechi intai. Nu arunca niciodata."""
out: list[dict] = []
try:
paths = sorted(approvals_dir().glob("*.json"))
except Exception:
return out
for p in paths:
req = _read(p)
if not req or req.get("status") != PENDING:
continue
out.append(
{
"request_id": req.get("request_id") or p.stem,
"thread_id": req.get("thread_id"),
"tool_name": req.get("tool_name") or "",
"command": req.get("command") or "",
"created_at": req.get("created_at") or 0.0,
"reason": req.get("reason") or "",
}
)
out.sort(key=lambda r: r["created_at"])
return out
_on_request = None
_watch_task = None
_seen: set[str] = set()
def set_on_request(callback) -> None:
"""Inregistreaza un callback async apelat cand apare o cerere noua.
Botul posteaza atunci butoanele in firul Discord. Un callback `None`
opreste urmarirea.
"""
global _on_request, _watch_task
_on_request = callback
if callback is None:
stop_watcher()
return
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
except RuntimeError:
return # fara bucla activa nu pornim nimic; se reapeleaza din bot
if _watch_task is None or _watch_task.done():
_watch_task = loop.create_task(_watch_loop())
def stop_watcher() -> None:
global _watch_task
if _watch_task is not None and not _watch_task.done():
_watch_task.cancel()
_watch_task = None
async def _watch_loop() -> None:
"""Urmareste directorul de cereri si anunta botul o singura data per cerere."""
while True:
try:
for req in await pending_requests():
rid = req["request_id"]
if rid in _seen:
continue
_seen.add(rid)
cb = _on_request
if cb is None:
continue
try:
res = cb(req)
if asyncio.iscoroutine(res):
await res
except Exception:
pass # un callback care crapa nu are voie sa opreasca botul
if len(_seen) > 5000:
_seen.clear()
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except Exception:
pass
await asyncio.sleep(_WATCH_S)

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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
{
"_comentariu": "Sablon pentru ~/.claude-discord/bot-settings.json, pasat cu --settings. Copiaza-l si ajusteaza calea absoluta a hook-ului daca repo-ul nu e in /workspace/romfastsql.",
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "python3 /workspace/romfastsql/proxmox/lxc171-claude-agent/discord-bridge/security/confirm_hook.py",
"timeout": 330
}
]
}
]
},
"permissions": {
"_comentariu": "STRAT COSMETIC, NU BARIERA: sub --permission-mode bypassPermissions regulile deny nu opresc /usr/bin/ssh sau bash -c \"ssh\". Bariera reala e hook-ul PreToolUse de mai sus.",
"deny": [
"Bash(ssh:*)",
"Bash(scp:*)",
"Bash(pct destroy:*)",
"Bash(qm destroy:*)",
"Bash(zfs destroy:*)"
]
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Hook PreToolUse: cere confirmare in Discord pentru operatiuni ireversibile.
Contract Claude Code: primeste pe stdin un JSON de forma
{"session_id": "...", "cwd": "...", "hook_event_name": "PreToolUse",
"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "..."}}
si raspunde pe stdout cu
{"hookSpecificOutput": {"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "allow"|"deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": "..."}}
Comenzile nepericuloase nu produc nicio iesire (exit 0) si urmeaza fluxul normal.
Cele periculoase produc o cerere in ~/.claude-discord/approvals/ si asteapta
decizia botului.
FAIL-CLOSED: orice exceptie, timeout, director lipsa sau JSON corupt => deny.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import pathlib
import re
import shlex
import sys
# Ca `import config` (Lane A) sa functioneze si cand hook-ul e pornit ca script.
_HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
for _p in (str(_HERE), str(_HERE.parent)):
if _p not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _p)
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S = 300.0
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ constante
# Prefixe care doar impacheteaza alta comanda; le desfacem inainte de analiza.
_WRAPPERS = {
"sudo", "doas", "nohup", "nice", "ionice", "time", "command", "exec",
"stdbuf", "setsid", "env", "eatmydata",
}
# Wrappere care au un argument numeric/optiune proprie de sarit.
_WRAPPER_OPT_ARG = {"timeout": 1, "nice": 0, "ionice": 0}
_SHELLS = {"bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "ksh", "ash", "busybox"}
# Servicii de infrastructura: oprirea lor rupe ceva ce altcineva foloseste.
_INFRA_SERVICES = (
"pve", "pvedaemon", "pveproxy", "pvestatd", "pve-cluster", "pve-firewall",
"corosync", "ceph", "zfs", "oracle", "oracle-xe", "flowise", "gitea",
"docker", "containerd", "nginx", "apache2", "ttyd", "ssh", "sshd",
"postgresql", "mysql", "mariadb", "tailscaled", "smbd", "nfs-server",
"claude-discord", "nut-server", "nut-monitor",
)
# Hosturi de productie: orice comanda remote catre ele cere confirmare.
_PROD_HOSTS = (
"10.0.20.36", "10.0.20.37", "10.0.20.200", "10.0.20.201", "10.0.20.202",
"pve1", "pvemini", "pveelite", "oracle-prod", "dr", "roacentral",
)
_REMOTE_EXEC = {"ssh", "scp", "rsync", "sftp", "infra", "ansible", "ansible-playbook"}
_SQL_DESTRUCTIVE = re.compile(
r"\b(drop|truncate)\s+"
r"(table|user|tablespace|schema|database|index|view|sequence|materialized|"
r"package|body|procedure|function|trigger|type|synonym|directory)\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_SENSITIVE_ROOTS = ("/", "/etc", "/usr", "/boot", "/var", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/opt")
# ------------------------------------------------------------- tokenizare
def _tokenize(cmd: str) -> list[str]:
"""Imparte comanda in token-uri, cu `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `>` separate.
Daca lexerul esueaza (ghilimele neinchise), cadem pe o impartire naiva --
scopul e detectia, nu executia.
"""
try:
lex = shlex.shlex(cmd, posix=True, punctuation_chars=True)
lex.whitespace_split = True
return list(lex)
except Exception:
return cmd.replace(";", " ; ").replace("|", " | ").split()
_SEPARATORS = {";", "&&", "||", "|", "&", "\n"}
def _segments(tokens: list[str]) -> list[list[str]]:
"""Grupeaza token-urile in comenzi separate de operatori de shell."""
out: list[list[str]] = []
cur: list[str] = []
for t in tokens:
if t in _SEPARATORS:
if cur:
out.append(cur)
cur = []
else:
cur.append(t)
if cur:
out.append(cur)
return out
def _strip_wrappers(seg: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""Scoate `sudo`, `env FOO=1`, `timeout 30`, atribuiri VAR=val etc."""
i = 0
n = len(seg)
while i < n:
tok = seg[i]
base = os.path.basename(tok)
if "=" in tok and not tok.startswith("-") and re.match(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=", tok):
i += 1
continue
if base in _WRAPPERS or base in _WRAPPER_OPT_ARG:
i += 1
# sarim optiunile wrapper-ului si eventualul argument (ex. timeout 30)
while i < n and seg[i].startswith("-"):
if base == "sudo" and seg[i] in ("-u", "-g", "-U"):
i += 2
continue
i += 1
if base in _WRAPPER_OPT_ARG and _WRAPPER_OPT_ARG[base] and i < n:
if re.match(r"^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?[smhd]?$", seg[i]):
i += 1
continue
break
return seg[i:]
def _has_flag(args: list[str], short: str, *longs: str) -> bool:
for a in args:
if a in longs:
return True
if a.startswith("--"):
continue
if short and a.startswith("-") and len(a) > 1 and short in a[1:]:
return True
return False
def _mentions_prod(tokens: list[str]) -> str | None:
for t in tokens:
low = t.lower()
for host in _PROD_HOSTS:
if low == host or low.endswith("@" + host) or low.startswith(host + ":"):
return host
if host[0].isdigit() and host in low:
return host
return None
# ------------------------------------------------------------- clasificator
def classify_command(cmd: str, depth: int = 0) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
"""Returneaza `(regula, motiv)` daca cere confirmare, altfel None."""
if not cmd or not cmd.strip():
return None
if depth > 5:
return ("prea_adanc", "comanda impachetata pe prea multe niveluri")
# SQL distructiv: cautam in textul brut, indiferent de shell.
m = _SQL_DESTRUCTIVE.search(cmd)
if m:
return ("sql_destructiv", f"SQL ireversibil: {m.group(0).upper()}")
tokens = _tokenize(cmd)
# Redirectare catre /dev/... (suprascrie un disc sau un dispozitiv).
for i, t in enumerate(tokens):
if t in (">", ">>") and i + 1 < len(tokens) and tokens[i + 1].startswith("/dev/"):
if not tokens[i + 1].startswith(("/dev/null", "/dev/stdout", "/dev/stderr", "/dev/tty")):
return ("redirect_dev", f"scriere directa in {tokens[i + 1]}")
for seg in _segments(tokens):
seg = _strip_wrappers(seg)
if not seg:
continue
verdict = _classify_segment(seg, depth)
if verdict:
return verdict
return None
def _classify_segment(seg: list[str], depth: int) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
exe = os.path.basename(seg[0])
args = seg[1:]
sub = args[0] if args else ""
# --- shell-uri si executii la distanta: intram in comanda dinauntru
if exe in _SHELLS and "-c" in args:
idx = args.index("-c")
if idx + 1 < len(args):
inner = classify_command(args[idx + 1], depth + 1)
if inner:
return inner
if exe in ("ssh", "infra"):
host = _mentions_prod(seg)
if host:
return ("host_productie", f"comanda catre hostul de productie {host}")
# restul argumentelor formeaza comanda remote
rest = [a for a in args if not a.startswith("-")][1:]
if rest:
inner = classify_command(" ".join(rest), depth + 1)
if inner:
return inner
if exe in _REMOTE_EXEC:
host = _mentions_prod(seg)
if host:
return ("host_productie", f"comanda catre hostul de productie {host}")
if exe == "pct" and sub == "exec":
rest = args[2:]
if rest and rest[0] == "--":
rest = rest[1:]
if rest:
inner = classify_command(" ".join(rest), depth + 1)
if inner:
return inner
if exe == "docker" and sub == "exec":
rest = [a for a in args[1:] if not a.startswith("-")][1:]
if rest:
inner = classify_command(" ".join(rest), depth + 1)
if inner:
return inner
# --- stergeri
if exe == "rm":
if _has_flag(args, "r", "--recursive") or _has_flag(args, "R"):
return ("rm_recursiv", "stergere recursiva (rm -r)")
if _has_flag(args, "f", "--force"):
for a in args:
if not a.startswith("-") and (a in ("/",) or a.rstrip("/") in _SENSITIVE_ROOTS):
return ("rm_sistem", f"stergere in cale de sistem: {a}")
if exe == "find" and ("-delete" in args or "-exec" in args and "rm" in args):
return ("find_delete", "find cu stergere (-delete / -exec rm)")
if exe == "shred":
return ("shred", "suprascriere ireversibila (shred)")
# --- discuri si filesysteme
if exe == "dd":
return ("dd", "scriere directa pe bloc (dd)")
if exe.startswith("mkfs") or exe in ("wipefs", "sgdisk", "sfdisk", "fdisk", "parted", "cfdisk", "mkswap"):
return ("disc", f"operatie pe partitii/filesystem ({exe})")
# --- oprire/repornire
if exe in ("shutdown", "reboot", "halt", "poweroff"):
return ("oprire", f"oprirea sau repornirea masinii ({exe})")
if exe == "init" and sub in ("0", "6"):
return ("oprire", f"schimbare runlevel ({sub})")
# --- Proxmox / ZFS / LVM
if exe in ("pct", "qm") and sub in ("destroy", "restore"):
return ("proxmox_destroy", f"{exe} {sub} distruge/suprascrie un guest")
if exe == "pvesm" and sub in ("remove", "free"):
return ("proxmox_storage", f"pvesm {sub} pe un storage")
if exe == "pvesh" and sub == "delete":
return ("pvesh_delete", "apel API Proxmox de stergere (pvesh delete)")
if exe == "pveceph" and sub in ("destroypool", "purge", "destroymon", "destroyosd"):
return ("proxmox_ceph", f"pveceph {sub}")
if exe == "zfs" and sub in ("destroy", "rollback"):
return ("zfs_destroy", f"zfs {sub} este ireversibil")
if exe == "zpool" and sub in ("destroy", "labelclear"):
return ("zfs_destroy", f"zpool {sub} este ireversibil")
if exe in ("lvremove", "vgremove", "pvremove"):
return ("lvm", f"stergere LVM ({exe})")
# --- servicii
if exe == "systemctl":
if any(a in ("-H", "--host") for a in args):
return ("systemctl_remote", "systemctl catre alt host")
verb = ""
targets: list[str] = []
for a in args:
if a.startswith("-"):
continue
if not verb:
verb = a
else:
targets.append(a)
if verb in ("poweroff", "reboot", "halt", "kexec", "emergency", "rescue"):
return ("oprire", f"systemctl {verb}")
if verb in ("stop", "disable", "mask", "kill"):
for t in targets:
name = t.split(".")[0].lower()
if any(name == s or name.startswith(s) for s in _INFRA_SERVICES):
return ("serviciu_infra", f"systemctl {verb} pe serviciul de infra {t}")
# --- git
if exe == "git":
verbs = [a for a in args if not a.startswith("-")]
verb = verbs[0] if verbs else ""
if verb == "push" and (
_has_flag(args, "f", "--force", "--force-with-lease")
or any(a.startswith("--force") for a in args)
):
return ("git_push_force", "git push --force rescrie istoria pe remote")
if verb == "clean" and _has_flag(args, "f", "--force"):
return ("git_clean", "git clean sterge fisiere neversionate")
if verb == "reset" and "--hard" in args:
return ("git_reset_hard", "git reset --hard arunca modificarile locale")
# --- docker
if exe == "docker":
if sub == "system" and "prune" in args:
return ("docker_prune", "docker system prune")
if sub == "volume" and "rm" in args:
return ("docker_volume", "stergere volum docker")
if sub in ("rm", "rmi") and _has_flag(args, "f", "--force"):
return ("docker_rm", f"docker {sub} -f")
# --- permisiuni pe cai de sistem
if exe in ("chmod", "chown", "chgrp") and _has_flag(args, "R", "--recursive"):
for a in args:
if a.startswith("/") and (a.rstrip("/") in _SENSITIVE_ROOTS or a == "/"):
return ("perm_sistem", f"{exe} -R pe {a}")
return None
def classify(tool_name: str, tool_input: dict) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
"""Punctul de intrare al clasificatorului. Doar Bash e analizat in v1."""
if tool_name != "Bash":
return None
cmd = tool_input.get("command") if isinstance(tool_input, dict) else None
if not isinstance(cmd, str):
return None
return classify_command(cmd)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ raspunsuri
def _emit(decision: str, reason: str) -> None:
print(
json.dumps(
{
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": decision,
"permissionDecisionReason": reason,
}
},
ensure_ascii=False,
)
)
def _deny(reason: str) -> int:
_emit("deny", reason)
return 0
def _allow(reason: str) -> int:
_emit("allow", reason)
return 0
def _log(msg: str) -> None:
try:
d = pathlib.Path(os.environ.get("CLAUDE_DISCORD_DIR") or (pathlib.Path.home() / ".claude-discord")) / "logs"
d.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
import time as _t
with open(d / "confirm_hook.log", "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(f"{_t.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} {msg}\n")
except Exception:
pass
def _timeout_s() -> float:
raw = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_DISCORD_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT")
try:
if raw:
return max(1.0, float(raw))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pass
return DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S
def run(payload_text: str) -> int:
"""Logica hook-ului, separata de I/O ca sa poata fi testata."""
try:
payload = json.loads(payload_text)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("payload-ul nu e obiect JSON")
except Exception as exc:
return _deny(f"hook de confirmare: intrare invalida ({exc}); refuz din principiu")
tool_name = payload.get("tool_name") or ""
tool_input = payload.get("tool_input") or {}
verdict = classify(tool_name, tool_input)
if verdict is None:
return 0 # nepericuloasa: fara iesire, flux normal
rule, reason = verdict
command = tool_input.get("command", "") if isinstance(tool_input, dict) else ""
try:
import approvals # noqa: PLC0415 - import tarziu, ca eroarea sa cada in deny
except Exception as exc:
return _deny(f"hook de confirmare: modulul de aprobari lipseste ({exc})")
timeout = _timeout_s()
try:
req = approvals.create_request(
tool_name=tool_name,
command=command,
reason=reason,
rule=rule,
thread_id=os.environ.get("CLAUDE_DISCORD_THREAD_ID"),
session_id=payload.get("session_id"),
cwd=payload.get("cwd"),
timeout=timeout,
)
except Exception as exc:
_log(f"DENY (cerere neputincioasa: {exc}) rule={rule} cmd={command[:120]}")
return _deny(
f"hook de confirmare: nu pot cere aprobarea ({exc}); "
f"operatiune blocata ({reason})"
)
rid = req["request_id"]
_log(f"PENDING {rid} rule={rule} cmd={command[:160]}")
try:
decision = approvals.wait_for_decision_sync(rid, timeout)
except Exception as exc:
decision = "deny"
_log(f"DENY {rid} exceptie la asteptare: {exc}")
if decision == "allow":
approvals.finish_request(rid, "allow")
_log(f"ALLOW {rid} rule={rule}")
return _allow(f"aprobat in Discord (cerere {rid}, {reason})")
approvals.finish_request(rid, "deny")
_log(f"DENY {rid} rule={rule}")
return _deny(
f"neaprobat in Discord in {int(timeout)}s (cerere {rid}, {reason}). "
"Cere confirmarea si reia comanda."
)
def main() -> int:
try:
payload_text = sys.stdin.read()
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - stdin rupt
return _deny(f"hook de confirmare: nu pot citi stdin ({exc})")
try:
return run(payload_text)
except Exception as exc: # plasa de siguranta finala
return _deny(f"hook de confirmare: eroare interna ({exc}); refuz din principiu")
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""infra -- singura poarta prin care puntea Discord atinge infrastructura.
infra <host> <comanda...> ruleaza comanda pe hostul din lista
infra --list arata hosturile permise
infra --help
Hosturile sunt o lista EXPLICITA. Un host care nu e in lista este refuzat, fara
incercare de rezolvare DNS. Fiecare apel este jurnalizat in
~/.claude-discord/logs/infra.log cu data, host, comanda completa si rezultat.
Lista implicita poate fi inlocuita cu ~/.claude-discord/infra-hosts.json:
{"pvemini": {"addr": "10.0.20.201", "user": "root", "prod": true,
"desc": "nod Proxmox principal"}}
Coduri de iesire proprii wrapper-ului (comenzile remote isi pastreaza codul lor):
2 utilizare gresita (lipseste hostul sau comanda)
3 host in afara listei
4 eroare de configurare (fisier de hosturi corupt)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime
import json
import os
import pathlib
import shlex
import subprocess
import sys
import time
EXIT_USAGE = 2
EXIT_UNKNOWN_HOST = 3
EXIT_CONFIG = 4
# Lista implicita, din tabelul de retea al repo-ului (CLAUDE.md, proxmox/README.md).
DEFAULT_HOSTS: dict[str, dict] = {
# noduri Proxmox
"pve1": {"addr": "10.0.20.200", "user": "root", "prod": True, "desc": "nod Proxmox pve1"},
"pvemini": {"addr": "10.0.20.201", "user": "root", "prod": True, "desc": "nod Proxmox principal"},
"pveelite": {"addr": "10.0.20.202", "user": "root", "prod": True, "desc": "nod Proxmox pveelite"},
# servicii interne
"oracle": {"addr": "10.0.20.121", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC 108 Oracle XE 21c/18c"},
"flowise": {"addr": "10.0.20.161", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC 104 Flowise"},
"gitea": {"addr": "10.0.20.165", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC Gitea"},
"docker": {"addr": "10.0.20.113", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC 102 Docker + Portainer"},
"moltbot": {"addr": "10.0.20.173", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC 110 MoltBot"},
"dokploy": {"addr": "10.0.20.167", "user": "root", "prod": False, "desc": "LXC 103 Dokploy"},
# productie / clienti
"oracle-prod": {"addr": "10.0.20.36", "user": "romfast", "prod": True, "desc": "server Oracle de PRODUCTIE"},
"oracle-dr": {"addr": "10.0.20.37", "user": "romfast", "prod": True, "desc": "server Oracle DR"},
"roacentral": {"addr": "10.0.20.122", "user": "romfast", "prod": True, "desc": "VM 201 Windows, IIS reverse proxy"},
"oracle-test": {"addr": "10.0.20.130", "user": "romfast", "prod": False, "desc": "VM 302 mediu de test"},
}
SSH_OPTS = [
"-o", "BatchMode=yes",
"-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new",
"-o", "ConnectTimeout=10",
]
def state_dir() -> pathlib.Path:
override = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_DISCORD_DIR")
if override:
return pathlib.Path(override)
return pathlib.Path.home() / ".claude-discord"
def hosts_file() -> pathlib.Path:
return state_dir() / "infra-hosts.json"
def log_file() -> pathlib.Path:
return state_dir() / "logs" / "infra.log"
def load_hosts() -> dict[str, dict]:
"""Lista de hosturi: fisierul de pe disc daca exista, altfel cea implicita."""
path = hosts_file()
if not path.is_file():
return dict(DEFAULT_HOSTS)
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
raise SystemExit(_fail(EXIT_CONFIG, f"infra: {path} nu e JSON valid ({exc})"))
if not isinstance(data, dict) or not data:
raise SystemExit(_fail(EXIT_CONFIG, f"infra: {path} nu contine hosturi"))
out: dict[str, dict] = {}
for name, spec in data.items():
if isinstance(spec, str):
spec = {"addr": spec}
if not isinstance(spec, dict) or not spec.get("addr"):
raise SystemExit(_fail(EXIT_CONFIG, f"infra: intrare invalida pentru '{name}'"))
out[str(name)] = {
"addr": str(spec["addr"]),
"user": str(spec.get("user") or "root"),
"prod": bool(spec.get("prod", False)),
"desc": str(spec.get("desc") or ""),
}
return out
def _fail(code: int, msg: str) -> int:
sys.stderr.write(msg + "\n")
return code
def log(host: str, target: str, cmd: list[str], rc, dur_s: float, note: str = "") -> None:
"""Jurnal pe o linie: data, host, comanda completa, rezultat."""
line = (
f"{datetime.datetime.now().isoformat(timespec='seconds')}\t"
f"host={host}\ttarget={target}\trc={rc}\tdur={dur_s:.2f}s\t"
f"cmd={shlex.join(cmd) if cmd else ''}"
)
if note:
line += f"\tnote={note}"
try:
path = log_file()
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with open(path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(line + "\n")
except OSError:
pass # un jurnal care nu se poate scrie nu opreste comanda
def usage(hosts: dict[str, dict]) -> str:
lines = ["infra <host> <comanda...>", "", "Hosturi permise:"]
for name, spec in sorted(hosts.items()):
flag = " [PRODUCTIE]" if spec.get("prod") else ""
lines.append(f" {name:<13} {spec['user']}@{spec['addr']:<13} {spec.get('desc','')}{flag}")
lines.append("")
lines.append(f"Lista se poate inlocui prin {hosts_file()}")
return "\n".join(lines)
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
hosts = load_hosts()
if not argv or argv[0] in ("-h", "--help"):
print(usage(hosts))
return 0 if argv else EXIT_USAGE
if argv[0] in ("-l", "--list"):
print(usage(hosts))
return 0
host = argv[0]
cmd = argv[1:]
if host not in hosts:
log(host, "-", cmd, "refuzat", 0.0, note="host in afara listei")
return _fail(
EXIT_UNKNOWN_HOST,
f"infra: host necunoscut '{host}'. Hosturi permise: "
+ ", ".join(sorted(hosts)),
)
if not cmd:
return _fail(EXIT_USAGE, f"infra: lipseste comanda pentru '{host}'")
spec = hosts[host]
target = f"{spec['user']}@{spec['addr']}"
ssh_argv = ["ssh", *SSH_OPTS, target, "--", *cmd]
if os.environ.get("INFRA_DRY_RUN"):
log(host, target, cmd, "dry-run", 0.0, note="INFRA_DRY_RUN")
print(shlex.join(ssh_argv))
return 0
t0 = time.monotonic()
try:
proc = subprocess.run(ssh_argv)
rc = proc.returncode
except FileNotFoundError:
log(host, target, cmd, "eroare", time.monotonic() - t0, note="ssh lipseste")
return _fail(EXIT_CONFIG, "infra: `ssh` nu exista in PATH")
except KeyboardInterrupt:
log(host, target, cmd, "intrerupt", time.monotonic() - t0)
return 130
log(host, target, cmd, rc, time.monotonic() - t0)
return rc
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))
except SystemExit:
raise
except Exception as exc: # nimic nu iese neraportat
sys.stderr.write(f"infra: eroare interna: {exc}\n")
sys.exit(1)